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Abstract. Nuclear power plant accidents may be followed by a release of fission products into the
environment. This release is dependent on several phenomena, such as chemistry, pressure, type of the
accident etc. The aim of this paper is to assess the impact of the chemical form of iodine on the fission
product release into the environment.
Keywords: NPP, LOCA, iodine, containment, COCOSYS, fission products transport, WWER-
1000/V-320.
1. Introduction
Fission product behaviour and its simulation recently
become more important. Nuclear power plant acci-
dents in past decades revealed the need of proper defi-
nition and calculation of fission product mass entrain-
ing the environment. To successfully calculate such
phenomena, one has to specify the in-containment
source correctly. Several different approaches existing
up to date vary in the mass, the chemical form or time
characteristics. This paper is focused on assessment
of the impact of the chemical form of iodine release,
which is well known for its extensive range of chemi-
cal compounds and reactions within the containment.
A fundamental opinion on the complexity of iodine
chemistry in the containment during loss-of-coolant
accidents can be obtained from Fig. 1. Used models,
codes and brief overview on existing approaches are
presented further.
2. Description of COCOSYS
The COntainment COde SYStem is a lumped pa-
rameter computer code developed and maintained at
Gesellschaft für Reaktorsicherheit (GRS mbH). It is
used for best-estimate analysis of lightwater reactor
containments during severe accidents. The code it-
self consists of several modules, which calculate all
relevant phenomena. The thermal hydraulic (THY)
module solves the pressure and temperature build-up
history together with mass and energy flow. Further-
more it can simulate behaviour of engineering sys-
tems like valves, fans, pumps and sprays. A feedback
from aerosol and fission products is also considered.
The aerosol fission product (AFP) module is used
to estimate the behaviour and transport of fission
products and aerosols within the containment. The
core concrete interaction (CCI) module provides an
investigation of interaction of the molten core with
concrete structures during severe accidents. All men-
Figure 1. Scheme of iodine chemistry in NPP con-
tainment [1].
tioned modules are coupled to provide the desired
feedback on relevant phenomena. Furthermore, CO-
COSYS provides a coupling option with several codes
like ATHLET to simulate primary circuit behaviour
or a CFD code for detailed analysis [2].
COCOSYS has been validated against several vali-
dation experiments and is often used in safety analysis
of NPP concepts and existing power plants including
WWER type NPPs [2].
3. WWER-1000/V-320 Model
Description
The WWER-1000/V-320 type NPP containment is
a cylindrical shaped building made of pre-stressed
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concrete with an inner steel liner. For thermal hy-
draulic calculations, the inner volume has to be di-
vided into several smaller rooms. The presented model
provides an approximation based on 20 volumes, so
called nodes, which simulate the real space surrounded
by the building. These volumes are connected through
junctions providing mass and energy transfer. The
walls, floor, ceiling and inner structures are also mod-
eled to provide realistic heat transfer. Furthermore
the containment spray systems are also modeled. Two
large nodes (ENVIRON and BUILDING) simulate the
outer volume surrounding the containment. These
provide boundary conditions of the problem. The
nodalisation of the containment is presented in Tab. 1.
Compartments Nodes Description
E1 ENVIRON Environment
BUILDING Surrounding buildings
IGA501 GA501 Upper part of the
reactor shaft
IGA301 GA301A Lower part of the
reactor shaft
IGA401 GA401A2 Spent fuel pools
IGA701 GA701 Reactor hall
IASUPP CNT-U1 Upper section of the
building surrounded by the
containment wall and steam
generator boxes
CNT-U2
IASGBOX1 SGBOX-1 Steam generator box 1
IASGBOX2 SGBOX-2 Steam generator box 2
IASMED CNT-M1 Middle section of the buil-
CNT-M2 ding at the containment wall
IASLOW CNT-L1
Lower section of the
containment building
CNT-L2
GA311
GA306-1
GA306-2
GA306-3
IGA201 GA201 Spray water sump
IASTL22 TL22P Fan system
Table 1. Containment discretization.
The simulation of containment leak is maintained
by atmospherical junction. This is estimated to follow
the limits and conditions of operation of the WWER-
1000/V-320 type containment. The junction itself is
placed in the upper part of the containment connect-
ing the reactor hall and environment. The reason
for choosing this position is to simulate shortest and
easiest way for ejecting the material from containment
into the environment.
For calculation of fission product and aerosol be-
haviour the containment building has to be divided
into volumes so-called compartments formed by nodes.
Thus, compartments provide coarser fragmentation
of the containment building. The fragmentation of
the containment volume for iodine calculations is pre-
sented in Tab. 1 and Fig. 2. The calculations were
done using the AFP and THY COCOSYS computa-
tional modules.
Figure 2. Iodine compartment discretization of
WWER-1000/V320 NPP containment.
4. Initial and Boindary Conditions
Before the accident, the nuclear power plant is oper-
ated at 104% nominal power. The initiating event is
a primary circuit hot leg guillotine rupture at t = 0 s
with leak through breaks of equivalent diameter equal
to 850mm (large break LOCA) into one of the steam
generator boxes. Moreover, following assumptions are
taken into account [3]:
• loss of on-site power,
• only 1/3 of safety systems in operation (according
to conservative approach),
• no action expected from operators.
The entrainment of fission products into the contain-
ment is maintained through the break in the primary
hot leg. The ejecting coolant brings the fission prod-
ucts and aerosols released from the core. In accordance
with local practice the in-containment source term is
based on Ref. [4]. Following this approach failure of
all fuel assembly is expected.
In addition, whole fission product mass released into
the primary circuit is transferred into the containment.
This means that no fission products remain in the
primary circuit.
The Ref. [4] divides the problem of fission product
release into two areas, namely normal and core melt.
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The investigated accident does not expect the molten
core, so only the pellet-cladding gap inventory is taken
into account. The fraction of released fission products
is given in Tab. 2.
Fission product Pellet-cladding gap Fuel melt release
release fraction fraction
(30–1800 s) (1800–4680 s)
I, Br 0.05 0.95
Xe, Kr 0.05 0.35
Cs, Rb 0.05 0.25
Te, Sb, Se 0.00 0.05
Ba, Sr 0.00 0.02
Ru, Rh, Pd, Mo, 0.00 0.0025Tc, Co
La, Zr, Nd, Eu,
0.00 0.0005Nb, Pm, Pr, Sm,
Y, Cm, Am
Ce, Pu, Np 0.00 0.0002
Table 2. Fraction of the fission products released
during an accident [4].
A research on available in-containment fission prod-
uct source showed a significant difference between
each approach. Synchronization efforts on this prob-
lem throughout Europe pointed out the diversity of
the iodine species, the target medium (water, sump
or aerosol) and also the fraction of the core inventory
released [5]. It has to be mentioned that there is no in-
formation on time characteristics of the release. Based
on this it was decided to test, whether the chemical
form and also the target part of the zone has any influ-
ence on iodine mass entraining the environment. The
time characteristics and fraction released was adopted
from Ref. [4]. Finally, five calculations were done in
this sensitivity study, where the distribution of iodine
mass varied in chemical form. In addition, the target
part of the zone was changed too. Overview on all
calculations is given in Tab. 3.
Calculation Chemical Target part Iodine mass
form of the zone distribution [%]
c00
CsI
Atmosphere1
95
I2 4.85
CH3I 0.15
c01
CsI
Atmosphere
0.15
I2 95
CH3I 4.85
c02
CsI
Sump
0.15
I2 95
CH3I 4.85
c03
CsI
Atmosphere
4.85
I2 0.15
CH3I 95
c04
CsI
Sump
4.85
I2 0.15
CH3I 95
Table 3. Overview on calculated variants.
The total mass of fission products in the core is
based on values provided in Ref. [3]. The total amount
of iodine used in this calculation is 22.7 kg. It has
to be noted that not all the fission product mass is
expected to be radioactive. This study calculates the
behavior of the whole mass of iodine entraining the
containment.
5. Results and Comparison
The calculations were done for 14 400 s, what equals
to 4 hours. This time range was chosen to be repre-
sentative as the testing calculations showed that the
marginal contribution to the mass ejecting the con-
tainment during the accident is within first two hours.
Calculation c04 was neglected due to numerical error.
No. Description Mass [g] Deviation
from c00 [%]
c00 Base case (95% CsI,4.85% I2, 0.15% CH3I) A 4.94× 10
−3 0.00
c01
Modified iodine mass
distribution
(95% I2, 4.85% CH3I,
0.15% CsI)
A 2.33× 10−2 371.51
c02
Modified iodine mass
distribution
(95% I2, 4.85% CH3I,
0.15% CsI)
S 4.78× 10−3 −3.39
c03
Modified iodine mass
distribution
(95% CH3I, 4.85% CsI,
0.15% I2)
A 1.14× 10−1 2204.44
c04
Modified iodine mass
distribution
(95% CH3I, 4.85% CsI,
0.15% I2)
S err err
Table 4. Overview on calculation and results.
The trend of the release is in good agreement with
all calculations except c03, where almost constant
release rate can be observed. The ejected mass in
calculations c00 through c02 shows a massive growth
of the release within the first hour, then it slows down
and in long time view it shows stabilization of the
mass entraining the environment. This may be caused
by several phenomena, such as sedimentation or wash
down of fission products from walls into the sump.
The worst case presented in this sensitivity analysis
is c03, where the main mass was injected as organic
iodine into the atmosphere. It has to be noted that
this form is not expected to be a typical contributor
to the in-containment source, thus the results seem to
be unrealistic.
The second worst case is c01, where the iodine in
elemental form is injected into the gas part of the
zone. This leads to a high release of iodine into the
environment. In accordance to Ref. [6] the elemental
1The CsI aerosol can be injected only into the gas part of
the zone.
35
Adam Kecek Acta Polytechnica CTU Proceedings
Figure 3. Distribution of iodine in the containment (c00–c03, 14 400 s).
iodine is one of the main options of iodine mass release
into the environment.
The base case c00 provided results lower than the
two calculations presented before. The mass behaves
significantly different as the compound is expected to
be in aerosol particle form.
The lowest release was calculated for elemental io-
dine injected into the sump part. This may be caused
by high solubility of iodine species.
The results are presented in Tab. 4 and Fig. 4.
The distribution within the containment varies for
each calculation. In the case of c00 the mass is central-
ized in the containment sump. This may be induced
by the aerosol wash down. The c01 shows significant
concentration in the reactor hall. This is probably
caused by the chemical form, as the injection was in
form of elemental iodine into the atmosphere. Further-
more, c02 provides results close to the c00 calculation.
The injected iodine might be dissolved in water and
then washed down into the containment sump. Finally
the c03 calculation shows distribution close to the c01.
This is again induced by the injection of iodine as
a gas. The iodine mass is mainly distributed within
the reactor hall. The results of the calculations c00
through c03 at 14 400 s are presented in Fig. 3.
Figure 4. Iodine release into the environment
(c00–c03, 14 400 s).
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6. Conclusion
The presented calculations proved a significant impact
of the chemical form of iodine on release into the envi-
ronment. Furthermore the injected phase (water, gas)
is also an important factor significantly influencing
the ejected mass. Future effort should be made on
the assessment of the in-containment source, e.g. the
time range and the fraction of ruptured fuel assembly.
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